It is good to see that the Dawn Media Group has launched a much-needed discussion around population and its implications. A broad-based debate on population and its social, economic and development implications is largely missing.

It is striking that (macro)economists—who rigorously examine growth, employment, public finance, investment, productivity, and long-run development—rarely write about population.

The subject is often delegated to demographers, as if population has nothing to do with the economy. This flawed separation originates from valuing population quantity over quality.

Ignoring population means overlooking one of the most powerful structural forces shaping a country’s development trajectory.

Population size, its rate of growth, and the changing demography vis-à-vis available resources shape the quality of the population, which has broad implications for social, developmental and economic outcomes.

To begin with, population growth directly determines the scale at which a country must plan and govern. A high population base, combined with rapid growth—say, doubling every 30 years—dramatically alters resource demand and the developmental landscape.

Pakistan provides a vivid example. With its population growing at around 2.55 per cent annually for decades, Pakistan continues to struggle to meet the ever-increasing investment needs required to keep pace with this rapid population rise.

This has hurt the quality of the population. Recent Human Development Index numbers show that Pakistan has slipped to 168th place out of 193 countries, marking a 35-year low. This suggests deterioration, which is likely to continue if investment in human development does not match the need.

This is a hard task as population growth is outpacing resource growth.  Projections from the United Nations Population Fund’s (UNFPA) ‘State of the World Population’ report suggest Pakistan’s population will swell to 403 million by 2050 from 240.5 million in 2023, further deteriorating this quality.

A population that doubles too quickly—thanks to a higher base of 255 million—forces governments into a race they are structurally unequipped to win.

Pakistan is plagued by lower growth, which is not producing the required quantity and quality of jobs on the one hand, while lacking sufficient fiscal space to invest in social spending, such as education and health, on the other hand.

Structurally unproductive, massively unemployed, and underutilised (young) labour forces are the natural outcome. Demographic dividend is on the way to being lost. The window for it is closing.

The vicious burden of rapid population growth

A state with limited fiscal capacity suddenly faces an exponentially expanding requirement for public goods and services. In Pakistan, for instance, the total fertility rate (TFR) remains high at 3.5 children per woman, exceeding the global rate by a whopping 157pc, meaning the school-age population continues to grow rapidly.

In comparison, the TFR in Bangladesh is 2.14 and is expected to fall to replacement level by 2026, whereas Pakistan is projected to reach replacement level only in 2050 — a gap of 24 years. As a result, the gap between public service demand and supply continues to widen.

This creates a vicious cycle. Lower per capita investment in education, health, and skills results in a low-quality population which is poorly educated, malnourished, and inadequately skilled.

Pakistan’s public expenditure on education hovers around a mere 0.8pc of GDP, far below the UNESCO’s recommended four to six per cent. Consequently, the population is less productive, earns lower incomes, and therefore contributes less in taxes.

Lower fiscal resources then further restrict the government’s capacity to invest in human development. This connection between population growth, fiscal stress, and low productivity is direct and powerful.

The labour force that eventually emerges from such a population tends to be younger but less skilled. In Pakistan, a significant portion lacks foundational skills.

This labour force is underprepared for modern sectors and concentrated in low-productivity work. This low human capital base suppresses overall national productivity. Economic growth becomes sluggish, because productivity—rather than sheer labour supply—is the primary engine of long-term development.

This is reflected in the astonishingly high dependency ratio of 68.4pc in 2025. In other words, only 30 people of working age earn for 100 people. This ratio is 52.2pc and 46.1pc for Bangladesh and India, respectively.

This means more people earn for fewer people. It affects household savings, shaping national savings and investments. It further means a larger expenditure of the government to support this 70pc unproductive working age population.

This poor productivity and labour market profile discourages investment. Foreign investors are less likely to commit capital when they anticipate a workforce that lacks the skills needed for higher-value manufacturing and services. Local investment also becomes riskier, as firms struggle with quality constraints, inefficiencies, and the inability to innovate.

Thus, population growth, when unaccompanied by strong human development, traps an economy in a cycle of low productivity and low investment.

Comparing regional approaches: India and Bangladesh

The contrast between Pakistan and some of its regional peers underscores how crucial the quality of the population is for economic progress. India and Bangladesh, despite facing their own demographic challenges, have managed to bring down population growth rates to around one per cent.

This decline has been accompanied by deliberate and sustained investments in public services, especially education and health, improving the quality of the population.

Bangladesh, in particular, illustrates a strong link between population policies, women’s empowerment, and economic dynamism. Its TFR dropped from 6.7 in 1975 to 2.2 in 2023. By enabling women to participate in the labour force—primarily through the ready-made garment sector, microfinance networks, and community-based health services—Bangladesh effectively raised the opportunity cost of having many children.

Female labour force participation in Bangladesh stands at around 44pc in 2024, almost double that of 24pc in Pakistan, according to the World Bank.

When women have access to jobs, income, and mobility, they are more likely to delay marriage, have fewer children, and invest more in each child’s well-being. Reduced fertility, in turn, allowed Bangladesh to deepen investments in health, education, and infrastructure without being overwhelmed by demographic pressure.

India, although more heterogeneous, demonstrates similar dynamics. Lower population growth in many states has enabled more targeted public investment, better resource planning, and improved human development outcomes.

The demographic dividend—where a larger share of the population is in working age—has supported the country’s growth momentum, especially in services and technology sectors.

Work for Pakistan

Pakistan needs double the work. Create room for social investments and implement effective population management policies. The country must improve social spending and invest in education, health and skills to reap the demographic dividend.

Right expenditure prioritisation, engaging private sector investments with secure and predictable returns and adopting innovative alternative financing sources can create room for these additional social investments.

At the same time, population management is critical to escape its pattern of higher dependency ratio, low productivity and stagnant growth. In this regard, it is critical to see population growth in a broader developmental context of the country, as highlighted by UNFPA.

Pakistan must mainstream population policy and integrate it within the economic governance agenda. While there are many tools, including family planning and awareness campaigns, the most powerful lever available to Pakistan is to increase female labour force participation in decent, safe, and well-paid jobs.

When women have economic opportunities, the entire demographic dynamic shifts. Families begin to value girls’ education, fertility rates drop, and women’s increased incomes strengthen household welfare.

Economic inclusion raises the opportunity cost of childbearing, encouraging smaller families and more investment per child. The quality of the population increases further, catalysing these gains. This is exactly the pathway Bangladesh successfully leveraged.

Pakistan must, therefore, prioritise policies that improve women’s employment opportunities—through vocational training, safe transportation, childcare facilities, anti-harassment protections, and incentives for firms to hire and retain women.

Female inclusion is not merely a gender issue; it is a macroeconomic strategy with deep implications for population quality, management, productivity, and long-term growth.

Finally, breaking the higher dependency ratio barrier needs priority focus. This will require producing good jobs and livelihoods on one side and equipping the youth for modern skills, particularly middle skills, to promote productivity, employability and entrepreneurship.