One reason behind Chen’s appointment is to redress the balance of military attaches, as China has fewer in Africa than Africa does in China, according to David Shinn, a China-Africa specialist and professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.

“As Niger has ended security ties with France and the United States, China has stepped up arms sales, which is an added incentive to assign a military attache,” Shinn said.

He added that Beijing might also increase military training for Nigerien troops, but was unlikely to replace the assignment of French and American troops in Niger or try to replace the former American counterterrorism drone base at Agadez.

“Niger may convince Russia’s Africa Corps to take over these kinetic military activities, but not China,” Shinn said.

For China, protecting African interests is the major driver behind its military diplomacy in the Sahel.

China has significant investments in Niger’s oil sector. PetroChina, a subsidiary of China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), built a 2,000km (1,243-mile) pipeline to take oil from the landlocked country to Seme, an Atlantic port in neighbouring Benin. CNPC has invested more than US$4 billion in Niger’s petroleum industry and PetroChina owns two-thirds of the country’s Agadem oilfield.

Besides crude oil, Niger has Africa’s highest-grade uranium ore, which accounts for around 5 per cent of the world’s mining output. For decades its uranium has helped to fuel France’s nuclear power industry, but China is now angling to get that share to boost its own power plants.

Beijing has also moved to deepen military ties with the juntas in Burkina Faso and Mali, where Chinese companies have recently won deals to supply military equipment.

Burkina Faso, for example, recently received much-needed supplies from China North Industries Group Corporation, or Norinco, which is China’s largest weapons manufacturer. In January, the country took delivery of a large quantity of Chinese-made armoured vehicles; this followed a shipment of equipment last year which included VN-22 armoured vehicles.

Norinco has been positioning itself to tap into the West African military and security market. In 2023, it opened a sales office in Dakar, Senegal. And last year, the company signed a deal with Mali, another Sahelian country hit by multiple coups, to provide it with military equipment, training and technology transfer in key areas of defence.

China’s inroads into West Africa, especially in the Sahel, come at a time when France has been losing clout in the region after the military juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso pushed French forces out and the Russian-linked Wagner Group mercenaries moved in to fill the gap.

Like many nations in the region, Mali faces insecurity in some parts of the country as it battles militant groups.

Lina Benabdallah, an associate professor of politics and international affairs at Wake Forest University in the US, said China had indicated time and again that it wanted to be seen as a holistic partner for Africans, and this included military and security cooperation.

In the Sahel, Benabdallah said, China was cautious not to get tangled in issues sensitive to the French, but with France’s withdrawal, those issues were gone. This has naturally opened the door for Beijing to expand its presence and influence in the region.

“It is important to note that as France retreated, we did not see China jump right in,” Benabdallah said. “This means that Beijing is … moving steadily on its own terms, not as a reaction to France’s withdrawal but taking advantage of the opportunity to advance its own interests in the area.”

According to Ilaria Carrozza, a senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo, China’s engagement in the Sahel and West Africa until recently had mostly taken place in the shadow of European actors, particularly due to France’s strong colonial legacy.

However, Beijing’s interests in the region had also been influenced by concerns over stability and peace, particularly regarding Islamic terrorism, Carrozza said.

China had therefore been involved in a range of activities, including its deployment to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali and military training, as well as arms sales, Carrozza noted.

“This engagement is primarily aimed at protecting Chinese citizens working in the region and its economic interests.

Expectations had been high that China might be willing to fill the space left when France pulled out of Operation Barkhane, a French-led campaign against Islamist insurgents in the Sahel, Carrozza said.

But while the military presence of Western countries had reduced, it had not disappeared entirely, she added.

“So far, despite China’s more active role, there is little evidence of any significant ‘power shift’ from the West to Beijing.”

John Calabrese, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, said China’s strategy was aimed at fostering long-term stability, with a view to advancing substantial investments.

He said the shift also appeared to be driven by a desire to protect loans and investments, physical assets and Chinese personnel – without the need for deploying armed forces abroad.

“It addresses security gaps by responding to the needs of partner countries that lack sufficient internal capabilities while positioning itself to challenge Western dominance and potentially paving the way for deeper security ties, including arms sales.”

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